"THE PATHFINDERS"
MARINE PHOTOGRAPHIC SQUADRON 154
by Lt.Col. Steven James Finsterle USMC (Ret)
In the January 1990 issue of the VMD-154 Newletter, it was announced that squadron member J. Reid Clark had presented VMD-154 with a thesis prepared by his son-in-law, Major S. J. Finsterle USMC. It is now reprinted here with permission of the author. We offer sincere thanks for this invaluable history of USMC Squadron VMD-154.
Author's Forward
The purpose of this work is to highlight the history of the first United States Marine Corps aerial photographic squadron deployed to the South Pacific during World War II.
The complete lack of an official unit history with respect to this squadron and its activities posed a significant problem in developing a solid starting point for the paper. Although the absence of an official unit history is unusual in itself, this circumstance is partly attributable to the fact that upon the squadron's return from the Pacific in January 1944, virtually all of the squadron's original personnel were transferred to new organizations. This fact alone resulted in the loss of first-hand knowledge of VMD-154's activities up to January 1944. Occasional references made with respect to VMD-154 in official U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aviation publications are uniformly vague and inaccurate. The information which has been assembled in this paper was the result of an investigative process which drew on numerous resources. Official Naval Archives, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aviation publications, and personal interviews with former members of the squadron. All contributed elements to the building of a composite picture of VMD-154. For clarity's sake, selected annexes have been appended to the paper to more thoroughly elaborate on technical points and operational activities which may be of interest to the individual reader.
The paper begins by examining the question of "Why were Marine photographic squadrons established?" Within the context of this question, the paper seeks to describe the circumstances which led to this question arising and initial Marine Corps efforts to provide a suitable answer. Next, the paper will chart the birth of VMD-154 from its inception as VMD-2 together with its activities in the United States preparatory to combat in the South Pacific. The paper will then trace VMD-154 's deployment to the South Pacific and its support of amphibious operations in this theatre. Finally, the paper will outline the squadron's return to the United States, subsequent reorganization, and ultimate deactivation at the end of World War II.
This paper is dedicated to all veterans of VMD-154, and in particular, to the Marines of PB4Y-1, Bureau Number 31958, lost February 7, 1943, at Espiritu Island.
"The Pathfinders": Marine Photographic Squadron 154
As war loomed over the Pacific in 1941, the government of the United States belatedly recognized that if war came to the Pacific, Japanese secrecy with respect to its territorial possessions could deny the United States vital intelligence concerning Japanese activities and plans. Recognizing the threat which this situation posed to the successful conduct of Naval operations, the Department of the Navy determined that every U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and Marine amphibious force would have an organic aerial photographic capability. However, during the days prior to the outbreak of war, neither the equipment nor an organizational structure capable of achieving this goal existed within the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Marine Corps. As a result, on December 7, 1941 United States Marine Corps aviation was unprepared to accomplish the type of long range photographic missions foreseen as essential to planning and conducting amphibious operations in the Pacific.
The outbreak of war found the naval and land forces of the Japanese Empire establishing supremacy throughout the Pacific, virtually destroying the capability of the United States to readily acquire photographic evidence of Japanese activities and future intentions. As the United States Marine Corps prepared to contest Japanese control of the islands of the South Pacific, the vast distances inherent in amphibious operations in this region clearly demanded the presence of an organization responsive to the Marine Corps' need for long range photographic reconnaissance. Unfortunately, the only long range aircraft capabilities then existent in Naval aviation resided with the U.S. Navy's amphibious "Flying Boat" squadrons and not within the organization of Marine Corps aviation.
The Department of the Navy's exclusive reliance on the use of "Flying Boats" for long range reconnaissance was rooted in a national policy which clearly defined the broad responsibilities of U.S. Navy and U.S. Army aviation. Specifically, Navy aviation was responsible for coastal defense and cooperation with land forces. Land based aircraft were to be employed by the U.S. Army while the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps would be limited to ship or water based aircraft. The unfortunate result of this policy was that land based aircraft capable of accomplishing long range photographic missions existed but were unavailable at the outbreak of the war.
The U.S. Navy sought to provide a solution to the problem by employing amphibious type aircraft (Consolidated Catalina PB4Y-1s), none of which were assigned to or operationally controlled by Marine Corps aviation. The early use of "Flying Boats" as photographic aircraft resulted in grievous losses while completely failing to meet Marine Corps needs for a long range aerial photographic capability. Nevertheless, at the beginning of World War II, neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Marine Corps were able to acquire the type of modern aircraft suited to this mission. Before proceeding with an explanation of the measures taken to solve this problem it's necessary to briefly focus on the capabilities of Marine Corps aviation to conduct aerial photography circa January 1942.
On January 1, 1942 Marine Corps aviation was composed of two aircraft wings each comprised of a single aircraft group. Each group contained an observation squadron (VMO), charged with providing aerial photographic support to its respective headquarters. Although each of the two Marine Aircraft Wings, (First MAW, headquartered at Quantico, Virginia and Second MAW, headquartered at San Diego, California) rated a VMO by table of organization, only the First MAW actually had the equipment and personnel to form a complete VMO squadron. The fact was that at the outbreak of World War II, the entire organic aerial photographic capability of the Marine Corps resided in twelve antiquated Curtiss SBC-4s stationed at Quantico, Virginia. An inauspicious start at best!
By February 1942, the Department of the Navy was urgently requesting a reallocation of long range bomber aircraft production, and was specifically requesting a share of Consolidated B-24 "Liberator" bomber output (this type of aircraft then seeing particularly successful service as a patrol aircraft with the British Royal Navy Air Arm). Inter-service rivalry between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy had resulted in lengthy negotiations which ultimately led the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General George C . Marshall, to agree to provide the U.S. Navy with a share of B-24 production (6:146) U.S. Marine Corps aviation was now on its way to acquiring the tools needed to accomplish the long range photographic mission vital to amphibious operations in the Pacific.
During the period from December 1941 to March 1942, Marine Corps aviation rapidly grew; with existing aerial photography capabilities remaining in the organizations of VMOs and selectively modified aircraft in fighter squadrons (VMAs). Nevertheless, planning continued to create an aerial squadron whose sole mission would be the provision of photographic support to Marine amphibious forces. In April 1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered the establishment of Marine Photographic Squadrons on the ratio of one squadron per Marine Aircraft Wing. VMD-154 began its operational life designated as VMD-2 and was a component squadron of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing. Initially, the entire aircraft complement of VMD-2 was composed of three F2A-3 Brewster "Buffalo" Fighters (fitted with automatic wing cameras) and two SNJ-3 North American "Texan" Trainer/Scout planes. Developing the squadron's missions, training requirements, and organizational structure best suited to achieving effective aerial photographic support was only partially accomplished. Before VMD-2 could progress very far in answering these questions, the lessons of war would require study, analysis, and application.
The need for aerial photographic support for the amphibious operations planned for early 1942 compelled the Marine Corps to deploy the only aviation organization with an aerial photographic capability. This organization, VMO-251, First Marine Aircraft Wing, hurriedly exchanged its SBC-4s for Grumman F4F-3 "Wildcat" Fighters (equipped as photographic aircraft) and deployed to the South Pacific. At this point in the development of VMD-2, the use of high speed attack aircraft (like the F4F-3), flying at low level, was an appealing concept to senior Marine aviation officers. Not only would these aircraft remain relatively immune from anti-aircraft fire, but pilots would succeed in surprising the enemy before he could conceal his activities. (2:92)
The initial operations of VMO-251 in the Pacific immediately crystalized the necessity for Marine VMDs to be equipped with long range aircraft. In an attempt to provide photographic support for planning preparatory to the invasion of Guadalcanal Island, VMO-251 was compelled to operate its aircraft from Espiritu Santo Island, approximately 550 miles from Guadalcanal. Due to the limitations of its organic aircraft (F4F-3 "Wildcats"), and the absence of intermediate airfields, VMO-251 was unable to provide the Marine Headquarters planning the invasion with photographs of proposed landing beaches on Guadalcanal. The Marine Corps found itself incapable of acquiring the very information critical to effectively planning amphibious operations in the Pacific.
In typical "make do" fashion, VMO-251 overcame the limitations of its equipment in the following manner. Seventeen Marine aerial photographers were assigned to the U.S. Army Air Force's Eleventh Bombardment Group, based on Efate Island. Using U.S. Navy cameras, the Marine photographers flew aboard U.S. Army B-17 "Flying Fortress" bombers, and succeeded in photographing the proposed Guadalcanal landing sites. Although ultimately providing Marine planners with the photographic support necessary to complete planning the Guadalcanal invasion, by July 1942, the capabilities required of the forming VMDs were clear.
During VMO-251s service in the South Pacific, VMD-2 continued to train and organize. An initial squadron table of organization was developed and consisted (on paper) of sixteen aircraft. These aircraft were comprised of two divisions of eight planes, and were designed to provide VMD-2 with both a long and short range photographic capability. This structure centralized all aerial photographic capabilities within a single squadron (VMD) located in each Marine Aircraft Wing. Notwithstanding the normal organizational problems inherent in building any new organization, the lack of modern, capable aircraft was the major obstacle in developing the new squadrons.
On July 7, 1942, the Department of the Navy was awarded a share of long range bomber production; and on July 11, 1942, Consolidated B-24D "Liberators" were scheduled for issue to the U.S. Navy. A portion of these aircraft, redesignated PB4Y-1s were allocated by the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Marine Corps, and were subsequently provided to each forming VMD in August 1942. Concurrent with the acquisition of the B-24, tables of equipment for the VMDs were reduced to eight aircraft, all of the long range type. This reorganization was in keeping with a recognition of the limited quantities of aircraft available to the Marine Corps and the complexity of operating a single squadron composed of radically different types of aircraft.
While the B-24 "Liberator" would have its share of problems, perhaps its worth is best summarized in the words of one experienced Japanese fighter commander who fought in the Solomon Islands Campaign and termed the B-17 and B-24 as "the most difficult aircraft for Japanese fighters to shoot down." (5:464)
Following the acquisition of modern aircraft and a reorganized table of equipment, VMD-2 under the able leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott E. Bard and Majors John T. L. D. Gabbert and Andrew B. Galatian began the process of building a truly combat ready squadron. These three veteran officers (drawn from the ranks of VMO-251) and a small core of enlisted pilots and aircrewmen were veterans of hundreds of hours of flying in all types of Marine Corps aircraft. Intensive flight training in the newly acquired B-24Ds was conducted, and under the guidance of this veteran cadre, the new officers and aircrewmen joining VMD-2 were rapidly welded into a cohesive, combat-ready unit.
Notwithstanding their lack of combat experience, the officers and enlisted Marines joining VMD-2 during this period were the products of a rigorous aviation training program. Officers and enlisted men selected for training as pilots or navigators all underwent six months initial and advanced training at Naval Air Training Station, Pensacola, Florida. Following this period of training, successful graduates reported to advanced operating bases which provided additional instruction in aircraft falling into one of three broad categories: patrol bomber, seaplane/catapult launched-aircraft, or carrier/land based. During this period the Marines destined for service with VMD-2 were introduced to the aircraft they would ultimately fly in combat (PB4Y-1s). Only after successfully completing advanced training at an operational base would these Marines be assigned to a squadron for active service. Aircrewmen were generally selected during initial "Boot Camp" screening and underwent th